This study investigates economies of scale in the gaming industry. Vertical analyses of aggregate income statements were performed comparing large casinos with small casinos on the Las Vegas Strip and in Atlantic City. In addition, correlations between cost ratios and casino revenue of Atlantic City casinos were examined. The findings show that large casinos enjoy economies of scale in terms of cost of sales, payroll, and general and administrative (including marketing) expenses. The study suggests that consolidation via mergers and acquisitions to achieve economies of scale is a viable strategy for casinos to remain profitable in saturated gaming markets.
Introduction
As reported by Ryan (2001) , in 2000, while Nevada casinos raked in more gaming wins, their profits fell to the lowest level in at least 16 years. A big reason for Nevada's declining casino profits was the performance of Las Vegas Strip casinos, where profits, measured as income before taxes and extraordinary items, dropped from $538 million in 1999 to $185 million in 2000. In particular, poor results of small casinos hurt the overall performance of the Strip. According to the Nevada Gaming Control Board (2000), 15 "small" casinos on the Strip (those with gaming revenues ranging from $1 million to $72 million) had a combined loss of $129 million, in comparison with an aggregate before-tax income of $314 million for 22 "large" casinos (those with gaming revenues of $72 million or more).
The declining profits of casinos in Nevada reflect the tough market conditions facing the U.S. gaming industry in recent years. Gu (1997) has cautioned that relentless casino expansions on the Las Vegas Strip could cause overcapacity. Berns (1998) has warned that the U.S. gaming market is becoming overbuilt and saturated. According to Ader, Falcone, and Steinberg (1999) , there are serious concerns that U.S. gaming markets are either saturated or fast approaching saturation. In particular, both Nevada and New Jersey operators continue to face significant competition and challenging business conditions. In Las Vegas, continuous expansions and overcapacity have resulted in a highly competitive environment with increased pressure on gaming revenue and profit margins.
The pressure from intensified market competition is even more severe for small casinos. When the Bellagio, a hotel-casino with 3,005 rooms on the Strip, opened in late 1998, gaming analysts predicted that some second-tier Las Vegas resorts would close within 18 months (Wilen, 1998) . In fact, with new mega casino resorts opening to the public one after another, the number of small casinos on the Strip has been declining since 1990.
Cullen (1997) examines economies of scale in hotel operations and proposes areas in which economies of scale may be possible. According to Cullen, economies of scale in hotel operations can be achieved in purchasing and production, management, personnel, marketing, and finance. A large hotel company can achieve lower purchasing cost if production is standardized so that large quantities are bought. There can be significant economies in training and deployment of managers and other highly skilled personnel. Standardization of training can reduce the cost of training. A large hotel chain's national marketing should be cheaper per hotel, since market research and promotion can cover more than one hotel at a time without a significant increase in cost. Cross-marketing should further lower the cost of marketing. Financially, a large hotel company can raise capital more easily at lower cost because of its size. In debt financing, large hotels may enjoy lower interest rates due to lower risk associated with large operations. Cullen's (1997) propositions may apply to casinos as well. Casinos on the Strip and in Atlantic City are hotel-casinos typically comprising multiple revenue centers including gaming, rooms, and food and beverage departments. They have large teams of managers and skilled employees. Frequent and large-quantity purchasing of inventory is needed for their 24-hour food and beverage operations. Heavy marketing and promotion are commonplace in casino operations because of the competition for players. Finally, casinos have to update their gaming devices and properties to stay competitive, thus requiring a large amount of new capital investment. Christiansen (2001) suggests that steep economies of scale exist when there are high fixed costs versus variable costs in the predominant business model. Large organizations can depreciate and amortize fixed costs over greater volumes. With heavy investment in hotel rooms and gaming devices, casinos are typically fixed asset-intensive and are thus associated with significant depreciation and amortization cost. Depreciation and amortization may be another area that may demonstrate economies of scale in casino operations. Empirically, Lin and Liu (2000) examined the relationship between costs and operating scale, measured by total revenue, of Taiwan international tourist hotels. Their results show that there exist economies of scale in hotel operations.
Based on the propositions of Cullen (1997) and Christiansen (2001) , this study examines economies of scale in casino operations. In particular, the study focuses on cost of sales, payroll, marketing and promotion, general and administration, interest, and depreciation and amortization. This study attempts not only to verify the existence of economies of scale in casino operations but also to identdy the cost areas that demonstrate economies of scale.
Data and Methodology
Financial information of individual casinos on the Las Vegas Strip was not publicly available. Therefore, for the analysis of those casinos, this study used information from aggregate income statements of Strip casinos in the Nevada Gaming Abstract (2000) published by Nevada Gaming Control Board (2000) . Based on gaming revenue, the Nevada Gaming Control Board (2000) classifies casinos on the Strip into two categories: small casinos, which are defined as those with gaming revenues ranging from $1 million dently large casinos were more efficient in generating gaming revenue, achieving much higher gaming revenue per square foot and per employee. The casino departments of large casinos also had an advantage in their payroll and related expenses, which, at 18.5% of department revenue, were much lower than small casinos' 27.2%. Large casinos, however, incurred higher bad debt cost and promotion cost (denoted as "complimentary and preferred guest expenses") at 5.3% and 20.6% of department revenue respectively versus 0.5% and 16.9% for small casinos. With their lower payroll and related expenses offset by higher bad debt and promotion expenses, large casinos' total departmental expenses were 62.6% of department revenue, still lower than small casinos' 63.7%. Unlike small casinos that typically impose low betting limits, large casinos on the Strip are commonly engaged in high-roller operations. While their higher bad debt reflects higher risk associated with high-roller operations, their higher complimentary and preferred guest expenses indicate large casinos' aggressive promotion toward players, high rollers in particular. Large casinos' higher ratios in the two cost items reflect their particular operational feature, rather than diseconomies of scale. Note: Items starting from "Department Revenue" are expressed as percentages of total department revenue.
The above analysis of the four revenue centers of Strip casinos shows that large casinos were more efficient in revenue generation, achieving higher revenues per employee, per square foot, and per available room. Evidently, large casinos' higher labor efficiency has contributed to their lower labor cost as evidenced by their lower payroll and related expenses ratios in all four departments. Large casinos' advantage in purchasing, as demonstrated by their lower cost of sales to revenue ratios, is also obvious. Table 5 is a vertical analysis of the overall income statements of small and large casinos on the Strip. Here, each item is presented as a percentage of the total casino revenue. Among the three costs incurred in revenue centers-cost of sales, operated department payroll and related expenses, and other operated departmental expenses-large casinos outperformed small casinos in the first two, being two percentage points lower in cost of sales and 6.5 percentage points lower in payroll and related expenses. Large casinos, however, had higher other operated departmental expenses, 27.3% versus small casinos' I 22.1%. The substantially higher bad debt and complimentary and preferred-guest expenses of large casinos (see Table 1 ) should have contributed to this higher cost ratio, since the casino department is the largest revenue center of a casino-hotel on the Strip. Nonetheless, large casinos' lower cost of sales and operated department payroll and related expenses offset their higher other operated departmental expenses, leading to their higher departmental income, at 40.5% of total revenue, compared with the 37.2% of small casinos.
income before taxes and extraordinary items at 3.4% of total revenue. In contrast, higher expenses of small casinos, especially in the category of general and administrative expenses, led to their loss of 15.2% of total revenue, even before taxes and extraordinary items.
The sizable performance gap between large and small casinos provides evidence of the overall cost advantage of large casinos on the Strip. The itemized comparative analysis of cost ratios further indicates that large casinos enjoy economies of scale notably in the areas of cost of sales, payroll, general and administration (including marketing), depreciation and amortization, and rent. Large casinos, however, outspent small casinos in bad debt and promotion.
Evidence from Atlantic City Casinos
The revenue of each of the12 Atlantic City casinos far exceeded $72 million in 2000. None of those casinos could be classified as "small" by the $72 million benchmark of the Las Vegas Strip. To compare the performance of relatively small casinos with their large competitors in Atlantic City, seven casinos with gaming revenues below $400 million were singled out to compose a "small" group and five casinos with gaming revenues greater than $400 million were assigned to the "large" group. The "small" group had its mean gaming revenue at $268.2 million with a range of $163.9 million to $342.9 million; the "large" group's gaming revenues averaged $469.2 million, rangng from $400.4 million to $538.3 million.
Department statements of Atlantic City casinos were not available. Therefore, comparison of each revenue center for the two groups was impossible. Table 6 is a vertical analysis of the aggregate income statements of the two groups. Each cost item is expressed as a percentage of total revenue. The income statements of casinos published by the State of New Jersey Casino Control Commission (2000) were different from the aggregate income statements of the Las Vegas Strip in format and less detailed. For example, cost of sales and labor cost were combined as "cost of goods and services." Table 6 is a comparison of the aggregate income statements of large and small casinos in Atlantic City. Promotional allowances were the same for the two groups and doubtful accounts differed slightly. Large differences, however, existed in two major costs: cost of goods and services and selling, general, and administrative. In 2000, large casinos had the two costs at 44.1% and 18.8% of total revenue, comparing favorably with small casinos' 49.3% and 23.8%. Large casinos' lower cost of goods and services, which included cost of sales and payroll, are suggestive of their economies of scale in purchasing and labor. Large casinos' lower selling, general, and administrative cost (which contained marketing expense) may be evidence of economies of scale in marketing and general and administration. Large casinos also performed better in other operating costs and other non-operating expenses.
Economies
The P values (in parentheses) indicate the significance levels for rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficients are not different from zero. and small casinos of Atlantic City grouped by an arbitrary criterion of $400 million gaming revenue. The highly significant negative correlations between total revenue and the ratios of cost of goods and services, selling, general, and administrative, and other nonoperating expenses, confirm the cost advantages large casinos enjoy in those areas identified in the vertical analysis of income statements. In particular, the negative associations are strong evidence of economies of scale in terms of cost of sales, payroll, and general and administration including marketing. The better performance of large casinos, manifested in their higher ratios of gross operating income, income from operation, and income before taxes and extraordinary items in the vertical analysis of aggregate income statements, is also confirmed by the positive and significant correlation coefficients between the three incomes and total revenue. The relationships between scale of operation and depreciation and amortization and interest, however, were inconclusive. Finally the correlation coefficients provide no evidence that Atlantic City casinos enjoyed economies of scale in promotional allowances, provision for doubtful accounts, management fees, and other operating costs.
Summary and Conclusions
To examine economies of scale in the gaming industry, this study conducted vertical analyses of income statements for large and small casinos on the Las Vegas Strip and in Atlantic City. The correlation coefficients between scale of operation and cost ratios for Atlantic City casinos were also examined. Based on the findings of the study it can be concluded that there exist economies of scale in casino operations. Specifically large casinos exhibit economies of scale in the areas of cost of sales, payroll, and general and administration, including marketing. On the other hand, large casinos' advantages in debt financing and depreciation and amortization are inconclusive and deserve further investigation.
The overall cost advantage of large casinos has contributed substantially to their better profitability. While large casinos were profitable, small casinos in both Las Vegas and Atlantic City markets were operating with losses in 2000. In particular, the loss suffered by small casinos on the Las Vegas Strip was sizable. The findings of this study suggest that large casinos are more cost efficient and hence more profitable. They are advantageously positioned in gaming markets that are experiencing fierce competition. For casino operators, an important implication of the findings is that increasing the scale of operation may be the key to survival and success in gaming markets that are saturated or approaching saturation.
One way to increase casino operation scale is to expand the existing facility by adding more hotel rooms and gaming devices. Some casinos appear to be pursuing such a strategy. For example, according to the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority (2001), the Venetian, a 3,000-room hotel-casino on the Las Vegas Strip that opened in 1999, will add 1,100 rooms in 2002. A follow-up expansion, with undetermined completion date, will add another 3,000 rooms. After its two-phase expansion, the 7,100-room Venetian will be the largest hotel-casino on the Strip.
Increasing operation scale via expansion, however, may not be the best solution for casinos in saturated gaming markets. Expansions can further increase the pressure of saturation on existing casinos, including those engaged in expansions. A better strategy to achieve economies of scale may be consolidation via mergers and acquisitions. Gaughan (1991) argues that one of the main sources of operating synergies achieved in mergers and acquisition is the cost reduction resulting from economies of scale due to the increase in the size or scale of a company's operations. The successful merger in 2000 of MGM Grand and Mirage Resorts, two former casino giants on the Strip, is an example of the strategy. Strow (2001) reports that after the merger, the performance of the Bellagio, the newest and largest property of former Mirage Resorts, was much better in 2000 than in 1999. The improvement was due to significant cost-containment measures implemented mostly in the back of the house: 5% reduction in payroll, savings in purchasing, consolidation of customer systems into a central location, and combined marketing with MGM Grand following the merger.
Market saturation on the Strip and in Atlantic City is not expected to ease in the near future. Both markets will remain highly competitive. Economists expect more gaming mergers but fewer new resorts in the Las Vegas gaming industry (Leong, 2001) . The same trend could be expected for Atlantic City because of its similar market conditions. As reported by Curran (2001) , analysts are concerned that in Atlantic City the impending entry of the Borgata-a 2,010-room mega-casino now under construction-and a companion marina district casino planned by MGM Mirage will mean trouble for existing casinos, some of which are already fighting for their lives. Atlantic City casinos are expected to compete very aggressively for each other's customers when the Borgata opens.
In highly competitive gaming markets, increasing operation scale can help casinos remain profitable thanks to economies of scale. Consolidation via mergers and acquisitions may enable casino operations achieve economies of scale without increasing market saturation. For casino operators, particularly those facing cutthroat competition in saturated markets, consolidation via mergers and acquisitions should be a viable strategy for survival and growth.
